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POWER, RULES, AND THE WTO 
Fiona Smith* 
Abstract: Using Martti Koskenniemi’s theory about international law as a 
starting point, this Article examines how the interpretive heritage of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) constrains the interpretive options 
available for understanding the WTO rules. First, this Article describes 
Koskenniemi’s critique of international law as being in permanent conflict 
between visions of international law as utopia and as apology. It then ex-
amines how Koskenniemi’s theory, which was originally published before 
the WTO’s creation, would apply to the WTO. Finally, it concludes that, in 
the context of the WTO, the WTO’s interpretive culture restrains the slide 
between visions of utopia and apology that Koskenniemi claimed. 
Power in international politics is like the weather. Everyone talks about it, but 
few understand it. 
—Joseph S. Nye, Jr.1 
Introduction 
 As Joseph Nye’s quotation reveals, it is easy to talk about legitimate 
power in international politics without really understanding it.2 Defin-
 
 
* © 2013, Fiona Smith, Faculty of Laws, University College London. This Article is based 
on a paper presented at Boston College Law School’s Symposium, Filling Power Vacuums in the 
New Global Legal Order, on October 12, 2012, where Professor Anne-Marie Slaughter gave the 
keynote address. The author would like to thank Sean Coyle and all those at the Symposium 
for their comments on this paper, especially Professor Frank Garcia. 
1 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Changing Nature of World Power, 105 Pol. Sci. Q. 177, 177 
(1990). In 1995, the World Trade Organization (WTO) replaced the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) as the organization overseeing the multilateral trading sys-
tem. The 128 Countries That Had Signed GATT by 1994, World Trade Org., http://www. 
wto.org/english/thewto_e/gattmem_e.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2013). The WTO com-
prises 159 member countries and provides a forum for its members to negotiate trade 
agreements and to settle trade disputes. Understanding the WTO: Who We Are, World Trade 
Org., http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/who_we_are_e.htm (last visited 
Apr. 2, 2013). 
2 See id. Power is a highly controversial and contested concept. Nye famously divided 
the analysis into “hard power” (i.e., the ability to wield military power), “soft power” (i.e., 
the ability to influence states’ behavior through other means like export of culture and 
democracy), and “smart power” (i.e., the combination of hard and soft power into strate-
gies to wield influence). See Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Future of Power, at xiii–xiv (2011) 
[hereinafter Nye, The Future of Power]; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power: The Means 
to Success in World Politics, at xiii (2004) (describing the concept of “smart power”); 
Richard L. Armitage & Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Introduction to CSIS Commission on Smart 
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ing what power is in the World Trade Organization (WTO) is especially 
challenging because the WTO is a highly complex and developed insti-
tutional response to the coordination of international political relation-
ships between states in the context of trade. 
 As an academic specializing in doctrinal analysis of the WTO’s 
rules, I am interested in what place rules could occupy in a theory of 
legitimate power for the WTO.3 This Article does not claim to resolve 
this question. Instead, as a first step toward deeper reflection in later 
work, it tries to tease out how the rules work when they are interpreted 
by the panels and Appellate Body in WTO dispute settlement proceed-
ings. Specifically, this Article examines the dynamic, almost autono-
mous, character of the WTO rules. To do this, the analysis focuses on 
one of the leading accounts of public international law to give an ac-
count of rules and their interaction with state power in international 
politics, Martti Koskenniemi’s From Apology to Utopia.4 Koskenniemi’s 
theory attempts to give concrete expression to legal practitioners’ intui-
tive sense that the rules of international law actively inhibit states’ use 
of power in this context.5 He recognizes that the ability to inhibit is 
connected to the fact that rules must be interpreted by an adjudicator 
in a dispute to bring them into play so that penalties can be imposed 
for any violation.6 Yet he denies that the power to decide on meaning 
rests with the adjudicator guided solely by canons of treaty interpreta-
                                                                                                                      
Power, A Smarter, More Secure America 5, 6–7 (2007), available at http://csis.org/ 
files/media/csis/pubs/071106_csissmartpowerreport.pdf; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power, 
Foreign Pol’y, Fall 1990, at 153, 166. Other scholars have contributed seminal discussions 
on power. See generally Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs?: Democracy and Power in an 
American City (1961) (examining the location of political power in American cities using 
New Haven, Connecticut as a case study); Matthew Eagleton-Pierce, Symbolic Power 
in the World Trade Organization (2013) (providing an interesting take on power in 
the WTO); Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View (1974) (arguing that there are three 
dimensions of power: decisionmaking, non-decisionmaking, and ideological); Peter 
Bachrach & Morton S. Baratz, Two Faces of Power, 56 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 947 (1962) (propos-
ing that studies of power consider both influentiality and decisionmaking). 
3 See Angelika Bammer, Vulnerable Writing 4–14 (Sept. 14–15, 2012) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author) (discussing the challenges faced in academic writing 
centered around questions and normative claims). 
4 See generally Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of In-
ternational Legal Argument (Cambridge Univ. Press 2005) (1989) (demonstrating how 
every valid legal argument in international law can be critiqued as being either an irrelevant 
utopian vision or a powerless and merely descriptive apology for the way states behave). Note, 
of course, that it is not only Koskenniemi that explores such an interesting and diverse ques-
tion. See generally David Kennedy, International Legal Structures (1987) (exploring the 
rhetorical structure of cases and arguments in public international law). 
5 See Koskenniemi, supra note 4, at 17–20. 
6 See id. at 333–39, 551. 
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tion.7 Rather, he reaches for the elusive intuition that something else 
about the rules is shaping which meanings the adjudicator can find 
when she uses canons of treaty interpretation.8 
 Ultimately Koskenniemi did not satisfactorily elaborate what that 
elusive “something else” was to his critics’ satisfaction.9 Indeed, his the-
ory was criticized as a deconstructivist account of public international 
law because he presented a vision of rules as either tethered to states’ 
power or wholly distinct from it, with the result that the rules appeared 
to lack any inherent, independent character of their own.10 In an ex-
planatory epilogue to the 2005 reprinted edition of his theory, Kosken-
niemi disputed this deconstructivist interpretation of his ideas, insisting 
that he did in fact give expression to the independent character of 
rules.11 Such advocacy for his ideas, in the face of criticism to the con-
trary, merely underscores how difficult it is to explicate precisely what 
phenomenon practitioners perceive when they work with rules. 
 The aim in choosing Koskenniemi’s theory from a plethora of work 
on power, rules, and law in international politics is not to argue defi-
nitely whether it correctly identifies rules’ character so that this theory 
can be extrapolated straight to the WTO to the exclusion of other theo-
ries. Nor is this Article’s aim to reject the published criticisms and offer 
this Article as the definitive work in an ever-growing and complex area 
of scholarship. Rather, this Article uses Koskenniemi’s theory as a way of 
inching ever closer to the elusive character of rules—that “something 
else” about the rules that is intuitively recognized by legal practitioners. 
 Thus, this Article argues that the language of the WTO rules plays a 
dynamic role in entrenching the meaning of the rules and that the in-
herited intellectual tradition of the WTO protects the rules from suc-
cumbing to the permanent slide between apology and utopia that 
Koskenniemi claimed. Part I reviews Koskenniemi’s critique of interna-
tional law.12 Part II examines how Koskenniemi’s theory, which was 
                                                                                                                      
7 See id. at 339. 
8 See id. at 563 (“I felt that none of the standard academic treatments really captured 
or transmitted the simultaneous sense of rigorous formalism and substantive or political 
open-endedness of argument about international law that seemed so striking to me.”). 
9 See, e.g., Iain Scobbie, Towards the Elimination of International Law: Some Radical Scepticism 
About Sceptical Radicalism, 61 Brit. Yearbook Int’l L. 339, 352 (1990) (arguing that even if 
“Koskenniemi’s desired meta-position were available, his book sets out neither the epistemic 
nor the ontological aspects of that position, and so his thesis begs more questions than it can 
attempt to answer because it can give no basis for the conclusion it offers”). 
10 See id. at 346, 352. 
11 See Koskenniemi, supra note 4, at 603–16. 
12 See infra notes 15–44 and accompanying text. 
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originally crafted before the WTO’s creation, would apply to the 
WTO.13 Part III then explores how interpretation of WTO rules works 
in practice by tracing the influence of the WTO’s interpretive heritage.14 
I. Koskenniemi’s Critique of International Law 
 In From Apology to Utopia, Koskenniemi argued that there is a per-
manent tension in public international law because it is either viewed as 
a “utopia” or as an “apology.”15 Under the view of international law as 
utopia, the law is a series of “formal patterns” and structures wholly un-
connected to the practice of states in their international affairs.16 Al-
ternatively, under the view of law as apology, international law is simply 
a series of practices that protect a range of vested interests or power of 
states.17 
 In the view of law as utopia, under which law is understood as for-
mal structures (i.e., cases, treaties, and sources), Koskenniemi found 
existing scholarship discussed such structures “as if the[y] were uncon-
nected with the ways of using them in argument in the institutional 
contexts in which international lawyers worked.”18 On this view, the 
scholarship suggested a readily discernible and stable relationship 
among the rules, the sources, the institutional structures, and the 
power relationships between states where international law operated.19 
Interpretation of the rules in this vision of public international law was 
generally regarded as a process of trying to fix permanent meanings to 
rules, principles and institutions to offset the abuse of power by states.20 
This method of establishing the laws’ meaning (generally), Kosken-
niemi argued, did not recognize the dynamic nature of public interna-
tional law in international politics and did not appreciate that the ever-
changing political context within which the law was operating would 
create new interpretations of the rules and new paradigms.21 
                                                                                                                      
13 See infra notes 45–73 and accompanying text. 
14 See infra notes 74–113 and accompanying text. 
15 See Koskenniemi, supra note 4, at 17, 342. 
16 See id. at 17, 564, 584 (“A law which would base itself on principles which are unre-
lated to State behaviour, will or interest would seem utopian, incapable of demonstrating 
its own content in any reliable way.”). 
17 See id. at 17, 171–72 (“A law which would lack distance from State behaviour would 
amount to a non-normative apology, a mere sociological description.”). 
18 Id. at 564. 
19 See id. 
20 See id. 
21 See Koskenniemi, supra note 4, at 564. 
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 In the view of law as apology, the existing scholarship understood 
public international law only as an instrument of vested interests of 
states.22 Hence, public international law’s significance only ever lay in 
its ability to make all states “behave” in a certain set of circumstances.23 
Therefore, law could only ever be explained in terms of politics and did 
not have any formal content that could be understood in its own 
terms.24 The law’s meaning in this case was highly unstable, moving 
around in tune with state practice at any one time.25 The act of inter-
pretation of rules could then only be explained as the adjudicators 
simply attuning the rules to that practice, rather than trying to establish 
any fixed meanings for the rules as distinct from the Realpolitik envi-
ronment in which they were designed to operate.26 
 Like the view of law as utopia, Koskenniemi felt the view of law as 
apology was also an untrue account of the nature of public interna-
tional law because, as he noted in his 2005 epilogue, the government 
officials he advised on aspects of public international law would have 
been very surprised if his advice to them was simply: the law is all about 
what governments want to do.27 The officials were clearly expecting the 
law to impose some greater independent curb on the exercise of state 
power rather than simply legitimating the activities of whichever states 
were the most dominant in the international arena at the time. 
Koskenniemi felt the true explanation of the nature of public interna-
tional law as witnessed in its interpretation by adjudicators and others 
interacting with the rules (e.g., states) was that there would always be 
permanent slide between ways of conceptualizing the law as either uto-
pia or apology.28 State practice will either always determine what the 
law is (apology), or the normative content of the law will always over-
ride the state practice (utopianism).29 For Koskenniemi, there is no 
middle ground.30 Therefore, Koskenniemi argued: 
                                                                                                                      
22 See id. at 45, 565. 
23 See id. at 565. 
24 See id. 
25 See id. 
26 See id. at 522. 
27 See Koskenniemi, supra note 4, at 564. 
28 See id. at 565 (describing the “oscillation” between utopia and apology that defines 
international law). 
29 Id. at 17; see Scobbie, supra note 9, at 341 (“Koskenniemi’s central argument is that 
international law is irredeemably indeterminate because it is predicated on the conceptual 
opposition of apology and utopia.”). 
30 See Koskenniemi, supra note 4, at 59; Scobbie, supra note 9, at 341. 
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[R]ules are not automatically applicable. They need interpre-
tation and interpretation seems subjective. This is not merely 
a “practical” difficulty of interpretation. The doctrine of sov-
ereign equality makes it impossible to decide between com-
peting interpretations. . . . [T]here is no other basis to make 
the [interpretative] choice than either by referring to a the-
ory of justice or to the identities of the States involved: one in-
terpretation is better either because it is more just or because 
it is produced by this, and not that, State. And the former so-
lution is utopian, the latter violates sovereign equality. Both 
seem purely political.31 
Thus, for Koskenniemi there was a permanent tension in public inter-
national law practice (and scholarship) between understanding law as 
apology and law as utopia, which then drives how that law in a specific 
instance will be interpreted.32 When international actors are interpret-
ing public international law rules, the justification for fixing on one 
meaning of a rule rather than another, can, on this view, only ever be 
grounded in one idea of what the relationship is between the law and 
the actors who are called upon to give the law “life.”33 This group of 
actors would clearly encompass the states that agree how to draft the 
rules in the first instance, but equally, it would also include those inter-
preting the rules, such as government ministers who determine the 
rules’ application, or adjudicators who apply the law in dispute settle-
ment proceedings, or even nongovernmental organizations that de-
termine rules’ meaning as part of their own issue campaigns. For 
Koskenniemi, there was no other way to re-imagine the problem.34 
 Can Koskenniemi’s theory of the nature of public international law 
help to explain the way WTO law works? Does it adequately reveal that 
elusive characteristic practitioners feel when they work with WTO law? 
As Koskenniemi himself found, it is very difficult to get to the precise 
way public international law works in international relations.35 Kosken-
niemi tried to illuminate this elusive nature by working across many as-
pects, spanning doctrinal history, state sovereignty, sources, custom, and 
                                                                                                                      
31 Koskenniemi, supra note 4, at 282. 
32 See id. at 17–20, 65, 573–76. 
33 See id. at 65 (describing reconciliation between two sets of arguments as impossible); 
see also id. at 365–85 (providing examples of international law interpretation). 
34 See id. at 386–87. 
35 See id. at 562–66. 
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the nature of legal argument, among others.36 Yet his prime focus re-
mained on the interpretation of public international law in each in-
stance. For, he believed, interpretation revealed the indeterminate na-
ture of the language of the rules.37 Language’s inherent nature guaran-
teed interpreters could not fix a permanent meaning onto those rules, 
so inevitably it was always open to an interpreter to make political 
choices on the rules’ meaning in every instance.38 This led Koskenniemi 
to his apology-utopian conception of public international law’s charac-
ter.39 For Koskenniemi, interpretation held the key to unlocking the 
true nature of public international law.40 This focus on interpretation in 
Koskenniemi’s theory at least did not receive stringent criticism.41 
 Accepting Koskenniemi’s insight that understanding interpreta-
tion is the key to unlocking the elusive character of public international 
law, the discussion now turns to reflect further on the nature of WTO 
law by concentrating on its interpretation by the panels and Appellate 
Body in dispute settlement proceedings.42 This Article argues that the 
language in which the WTO rules are expressed plays a dynamic role in 
entrenching the rules’ meaning when they are interpreted by the pan-
els and Appellate Body in disputes.43 This dynamic role does not seem 
to be attributed simply to the working of a kind of doctrine of prece-
dent—an external constraint imposed on the interpreter to follow pre-
                                                                                                                      
36 See id. at 71–157 (doctrinal history); id. at 224–302 (state sovereignty); id. at 303–87 
(sources); id. at 388–473 (custom); id. at 474–512 (structure of international legal argu-
ment). 
37 See Koskenniemi, supra note 4, at 63–64, 333. 
38See id. at 474–75. 
39 See id. 
40 See id. at 63–64. 
41 For example, Iain Scobbie was more interested in rejecting the theoretical basis of 
Koskenniemi’s book, specifically its emphasis on deconstruction. See Scobbie, supra note 9, 
at 340–49. 
42 The substantive rules of the WTO are contained in Annexes to the Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. Marrakesh Agreement Establish-
ing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter Mar-
rakesh Agreement]. These substantive rules are made effective through Article XVI:4 of 
the Marrakesh Agreement, which requires members to ensure their “laws, regulations and 
administrative procedures” conform to the rules contained in the Annexes to the Mar-
rakesh Agreement. See id. art. XVI, ¶ 4. Note also that there are additional Ministerial Dec-
larations and Decisions, which are in many cases indications of best practice. See, e.g., Deci-
sion on Measures Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of the Reform Programme on 
Least-Developed and Net-Food Importing Developing Countries, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement, 1867 U.N.T.S. 60 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1995) (granting special considera-
tion to certain countries based on the anticipated negative consequences of a reduction in 
agricultural subsidies). 
43 See infra notes 74–113 and accompanying text. 
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vious decisions.44 Instead, it appears to be a characteristic of the rules’ 
language itself. 
II. Koskenniemi’s Theory and WTO Rules in Dispute  
Settlement Proceedings 
 The prevailing view in WTO scholarship is that the canons of in-
terpretation from the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (the 
“Vienna Convention”) alone enable the panelists and Appellate Body to 
“find” the rules’ meaning, which they then apply to the measure in the 
dispute.45 Article 3.2 of the WTO Understanding on Rules and Proce-
dures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (the “Dispute Settlement 
Understanding” or “DSU”) governs interpretation of the WTO Agree-
ments.46 It gives the panels and Appellate Body the power to adjudicate 
disputes between Members, but only to 
preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the Cov-
ered Agreements, . . . and to clarify the existing provisions of 
those agreements in accordance with the customary rules of 
interpretation of public international law. Recommendations and 
Rulings of the DSB [Dispute Settlement Body] cannot add to or dimin-
ish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements.47 
                                                                                                                      
44 The Appellate Body has endorsed a quasi-precedent type doctrine: the doctrine of “le-
gitimate expectations,” which encourages panels to follow previous decisions where possible. 
See Appellate Body Report, Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, 14, WT/DS8/AB/R (Oct. 4, 
1996) (“Adopted panel reports are an important part of the GATT acquis. They are often 
considered by subsequent panels. They create legitimate expectations among WTO Mem-
bers, and, therefore, should be taken into account where they are relevant to any dispute.”). 
There has been a trenchant battle over the controversial “zeroing” method for calculating 
anti-dumping duties where the panel tried to reject the “precedent” effect of the Appellate 
Body’s findings in earlier cases. Compare Appellate Body Report, United States—Final Anti-
Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico, ¶¶ 145–162, WT/DS344/AB/R (Apr. 30, 2008) 
[hereinafter U.S.—Stainless Steel (Mexico) Appellate Body Report] (expressing concern 
over the panel’s disregard of Appellate Body jurisprudence), with Panel Report, United 
States—Final Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico, ¶¶ 7.98–.148, WT/DS344/R 
(Dec. 20, 2007) (consciously disagreeing with the Appellate Body’s line of reasoning on the 
matter). 
45 See Isabelle Van Damme, Treaty Interpretation by the WTO Appellate Body 
56–72 (2009); see also Gregory C. Schaffer & Mark A. Pollack, Hard Versus Soft Power in In-
ternational Security, 52 B.C. L. Rev. 1147, 1160–61 (2011) (“Without a third-party interpret-
ing the legal provisions which govern a dispute, the parties to the dispute can discursively 
justify their acts more easily in legalistic terms, and with less consequence, whether in 
terms of reputational costs or other sanctions.”). 
46 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 
3.2, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU]. 
47 Id. (emphasis added). 
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The customary rules of interpretation used by the panels and Appellate 
Body to interpret the WTO’s basic rules are those that are set forth in 
Articles 31 to 33 of the Vienna Convention.48 The panels and Appellate 
Body must start by ascertaining the “ordinary meaning” of the rules’ 
text in light of the object and purpose of the rule itself.49 Then, if that 
process does not yield an unequivocal or conclusive result, or if the 
panel and Appellate Body merely want to double-check the meaning 
they “found” using the first part of the process, they should go on and 
consider the text’s meaning in light of the object and purpose of the 
treaty text as a whole.50 
 Koskenniemi’s theory challenges the view that the only guides for 
the WTO panels and Appellate Body are the interpretive canons of the 
Vienna Convention.51 He would argue that there is an additional di-
mension to the ”finding” of rules’ meaning that influences which pre-
cise meaning the panels and Appellate Body will settle on when they 
are using the Vienna Convention.52 Further, he would argue that adju-
dicators always lean in favor of a particular meaning of the rules be-
cause they are influenced by either a utopian or apologetic vision of 
what the meaning of the rule should be.53 
 For Koskenniemi there is always a permanent tension in public 
international law because there is an inevitable slide backward and for-
                                                                                                                      
48 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31–33, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]; Appellate Body Report, United States—Standards for 
Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 17, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996) [hereinafter 
U.S.—Reformulated Gasoline Appellate Body Report] (applying the rules of interpreta-
tion set forth in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention). The Appellate Body particularly has 
also used the customary rules of interpretation as a way of implicitly bringing in other 
customary rules of public international law primarily through the “back door” by using the 
notion of context and Article 31.3. See Appellate Body Report, Korea—Measures Affecting 
Government Procurement, ¶ 7.96, WT/DS163/R (May 1, 2000) (“Customary international law 
applies generally to the economic relations between the WTO members. Such interna-
tional law applies to the extent that the WTO treaty agreements do not ‘contract out’ from 
it.” Not all academics agree with this, however. See Andrew D. Mitchell, Legal Princi-
ples in WTO Disputes 81–84, 88–103 (2008). 
49 See Vienna Convention, supra note 48, art. 31.1 (“A treaty shall be interpreted in 
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty 
in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”). 
50 See Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and 
Shrimp Products, ¶ 114, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter U.S.—Shrimp Appel-
late Body Report] (describing the necessary steps to treaty interpretation). 
51 See Koskenniemi, supra note 4, at 334–35. 
52 See id. Koskenniemi originally published his theory in 1990, five years before the 
Marrakesh Agreement that established the WTO. See Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 42. 
Thus, he did not specifically apply his theory to the WTO. 
53 See Koskenniemi, supra note 4, at 335–37. 
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ward between visions of law as apology or as utopia.54 He argues that 
interpretation of public international law rules can only ever be subjec-
tive, and therefore the justification for choosing one meaning of a rule 
over another must be grounded in a particular vision of the relation-
ship between law and the state, irrespective of any canons of interpreta-
tion that the adjudicators use to reach their conclusions.55 That is, state 
behavior either always controls law (and thus the law is only ever an 
apology because the meaning imposed on the rules simply reiterates 
state practice), or law will always override the behavior of the state (and 
thus any interpretation of the law is only a utopian vision of what states 
should do, but do not.56 
 In Koskenniemi’s terms then, the WTO’s rules might be thought to 
be either a series of formal structures or a series of instruments that cap-
ture states’ vested interests in trade.57 Accounts of WTO law would 
therefore be thought to “oscillate” between two poles.58 On the one 
hand, utopian accounts would try to perfect the normative content of 
WTO law so that the rules work more efficiently when measured against 
some internal criteria of perfection.59 In such an account the law always 
overrides the actions of the Members without taking into account the 
dynamics of state practice—that is, the law always overrides the behavior 
of the state.60 On the other hand, in an apologetic account, WTO law 
focuses on how the rules reflect the vested interests of the Members, 
where the inherent legal nature of rules as instruments to compel state 
behavior plays little role.61 
                                                                                                                      
 
54 See id. at 17, 65, 342 (“[D]octrine is forced to maintain itself in constant movement from 
emphasizing concreteness to emphasizing normativity and vice-versa without being able to estab-
lish itself permanently in either position.”). 
55 See id. at 61–69, 309. 
56 See id. at 65 (“The dynamics of international legal argument is provided by the con-
tradiction between the ascending and descending patterns of argument and the inability 
to prefer either. Reconciliatory doctrines will reveal themselves as either incoherent or 
making a silent preference.”). 
57 See id. at 171–72, 564, 584. 
58 See id. at 65, 565. 
59 See Koskenniemi, supra note 4, at 17. 
60 For example, consider the rejection of the United States’ “zeroing” methodology for 
the assessment of dumping in the context of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Appellate 
Body Report, United States—Continued Existence and Application of Zeroing Methodology, 
¶¶ 220–236, 395, WT/DS350/AB/R (Feb. 4, 2009) (using a highly textualist approach 
without regard to state practice). 
61 Koskenniemi, supra note 4, at 342. For example, the rules on international agricul-
tural trade in the WTO mirrored the United States’ and the European Union’s domestic 
agricultural policies at the conclusion of the Uruguay Round. See Timothy Josling, Agri-
cultural Trade Policy: Completing the Reform 26–27 (1998); Stefan Tangermann, 
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 Interpreting WTO obligations within these two competing concep-
tions of WTO law is thus, in Koskenniemi’s terms, a political choice by 
the panels and Appellate Body about which understanding of the rules 
is best.62 This choice arises because there is no independent ground on 
which to fix the meaning of the rules in Koskenniemi’s theory.63 Thus, 
either one interpretation of the rules is better because it produces a 
more balanced outcome that respects the stated fundamental premise 
on which the WTO rules are based or the other interpretation is better 
because it supports the power interests of the state being advised. Ei-
ther way, both choices are political, but the justification for choosing 
one meaning over another is always grounded in a particular vision of 
the relationship between WTO law and the WTO’s Members. 
 On this view of the nature of WTO law, Koskenniemi’s theory 
would suggest that the Vienna Convention’s canons of interpretation 
are merely a tool to enable the panels and Appellate Body to reach a 
conclusion on a rule’s meaning.64 Like any tool, however, these canons 
of interpretation do not possess autonomous power in their own right 
to direct the panels and Appellate Body to a specific meaning in an al-
most scientific way, but do themselves need interpreting. Koskenniemi’s 
theory would suggest that the way the panels and Appellate Body use 
the Vienna Convention’s canons of interpretation is very much driven 
by their own views about whether WTO law should be utopian and di-
vorced from state practice, or whether WTO law should represent state 
practice (law as apology).65 In other words, it is the panels’ and Appel-
late Body’s views of the underlying rationale of WTO law that enables 
them to see particular meanings of the rules as correct. In the context 
of a general theory on power in the WTO, this would seem to suggest 
that the power to attribute meaning to the language of the rules lies 
with the panels and Appellate Body, and the Vienna Convention is sim-
ply a tool to help them do this; the language of the rules has no distinct 
power in its own right.66 
 Nonetheless, the act of interpretation in WTO dispute settlement 
proceedings is multifaceted. The panels and Appellate Body appear to 
use the Vienna Convention’s canons of interpretation to enable them 
                                                                                                                      
An Ex-Post Review of the 1992 MacSharry Reform, in The Reform of the Common Agricul-
tural Policy 12, 20–21 (K.A. Ingersent et al., 1998). 
62 See Koskenniemi, supra note 4, at 342–45. 
63 See id. 
64 See id. at 334–35. 
65 See id. 
66 See id. at 335 (“Normal meaning has no independently normative character.”). 
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to develop an understanding of the rules. As an observer, however, the 
process does appear to go beyond mere use of the canons of interpreta-
tion. And it is here that the work of Koskenniemi’s theory does not 
carry us far enough. Koskenniemi’s conceptualization still places con-
siderable power with the panels and Appellate Body to elucidate mean-
ing from the rules (albeit driven by the utopian and apologetic ration-
ales), but says little about the elusive character of rules that Kosken-
niemi indicated that practitioners observe.67 
 Where Koskenniemi’s theory leaves off, however, James Boyd 
White’s argument for a “literary interpretation of law” may provide the 
next step in helping to elucidate the full character of the WTO rules.68 
Under such an interpretation, law’s true essence is uncovered by focus-
ing solely on the language of the law: the words, the grammar, the sen-
tence length, and the style of writing in cases, legislation, and the U.S. 
Constitution.69 Even though White discusses U.S. domestic law, his 
work is highly attractive to explicating the nature of WTO law because 
he exposes the full complexity of how doctrinal lawyers’ power to in-
terpret rules is constrained by actual judicial decisions and other legis-
lative and constitutional constraints. Additionally, he describes how 
lawyers use their understanding of those decisions to advise on what the 
law is in the dispute before them.70 He works from the actual rules to 
reveal how interpretation works, rather than from hypothetical exam-
ples or from a meta-theory of the nature of law. The appeal of White’s 
theory is partly that he was not theorizing about the nature of law in 
the abstract, but was instead trying to teach his new law students how 
legal reasoning works in the U.S. legal system as part of their basic legal 
training.71 
                                                                                                                      
67 See id. at 342–45, 563. 
68 See generally James Boyd White, Justice as Translation: An Essay in Cultural 
and Legal Criticism (1990) (examining a set of U.S. Supreme Court opinions as cultural 
and rhetorical texts and critiquing them from that perspective). Yet White’s argument is 
not without its critics. See Richard A. Posner, Law and Literature: A Misunderstood 
Relation 325–26, 467–70 (3d ed. 1988). Moreover, there are various ways that law and 
literature might be juxtaposed and diverse ways to evaluate the relationship between law 
and language. See generally 2 Michael Freeman & Andrew Lewis, Law and Literature: 
Current Legal Issues (1999) (collecting essays on the various relationships of law to 
literature, including the law of literature, law as literature, legal and literary hermeneutics, 
and law in literature); The Oxford Handbook of Language and Law (Peter M. Tiersma 
& Lawrence M. Solan eds., 2012) (compiling essays that explore and critically analyze vari-
ous relationships of language and law). 
69 See White, supra note 68, at xiv. 
70 See id. at xiii, xiv. 
71 See James Boyd White, The Legal Imagination, at xi (abr. ed. 1985). 
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 Placing the power to decide which meaning to adopt and how 
meaning should evolve in the hands of an interpreter, who is wholly 
cognizant of the restraints put on them by “precedent” or by the other 
rules in the WTO, is also akin to Ronald Dworkin’s “chain novel” 
idea.72 Dworkin, however, seems to suggest that the interpreter is fully 
cognizant of the restraint placed on her during this process, whereas 
White’s explanation gives a sense of both a voluntary and involuntary 
aspect to interpretation.73 Rather than elaborating on the relationship 
between Dworkin and White’s ideas, this Article focuses on drawing 
from White’s approach to describe how the WTO’s unique interpretive 
heritage operates as an independent constraint on interpretation be-
yond the limits provided in the specific language of the rules them-
selves. 
III. Beyond Koskenniemi: Interpretation and the Elusive 
Character of WTO Law in Practice 
 The WTO’s interpretive culture prevents it from experiencing the 
full extremes of the permanent slide between apology and utopian vi-
sions of law that Koskenniemi claims.74 Section A of this Part reviews 
the role that the expectations of the signatories to the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and WTO Agreement play in WTO 
rules interpretation.75 Section B examines the history of the GATT and 
WTO that led to this unique interpretive culture.76 Finally, Section C 
concludes that this unique interpretive culture acts as a constraint on 
interpretation and thus restricts the applicability of Koskenniemi’s the-
ory in the context of the WTO.77 
A. The Role of the GATT and WTO Agreement Signatories’  
Expectations in Interpretation 
 The WTO’s view of interpretation aligns with the Vienna Conven-
tion, which holds that the language in which the rules are expressed 
does not have any autonomous power in its own right.78 Instead, the 
                                                                                                                      
 
72 See Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire 228–38 (2006) (arguing that judges are like 
chain novelists in that they must follow and add to the precedent before them). 
73 See id. at 228. 
74 See Koskenniemi, supra note 4, at 17, 342. 
75 See infra notes 78–91 and accompanying text. 
76 See infra notes 92–104 and accompanying text. 
77 See infra notes 105–113 and accompanying text. 
78 See Vienna Convention, supra note 48, art. 31–33. Sociologist Stewart Clegg has argued 
that language can have autonomous power in certain instances, although his point relates to 
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language is only the container for the transmission of messages from the 
trade negotiators who drafted the WTO Agreement to those who are 
going to interpret the rules.79 This is not to say that the point of inter-
pretation, on this view, would be to try to fix the meaning of the lan-
guage at the point when the WTO rules were drafted in some originalist 
sense,80 but, rather, the purpose is to unlock precisely what the evolu-
tion of that meaning should be so that the WTO rules still regulate 
trade in the way that was envisioned when the rules were finalized in the 
mid-1990s. On this view, the decision, or power, to determine which in-
terpretation to adopt very much lies with the panels and Appellate 
Body.81 
 Certainly the WTO Appellate Body, in the 1998 United States— Im-
port Prohibition of Shrimp and Certain Shrimp Products (“U.S.—Shrimp”) 
dispute, seemed to believe it had the power to consider whether the 
WTO rules’ meaning should evolve, but it equally acknowledged that 
this power to alter the rules’ meaning subtly was to be undertaken 
against the backdrop of the settled and publically expressed expecta-
tions of the WTO’s Members.82 In U.S.—Shrimp, the Appellate Body 
addressed whether the United States’ import prohibition of shrimp 
caught using fishing methods that coincidentally trapped scarce blue-
fin tuna was exempt under Article XX(g) of the GATT because it was a 
measure “relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural re-
sources.”83 The Appellate Body stated: 
129. The words of Article XX(g), “exhaustible natural re-
sources”, were actually crafted more than 50 years ago. They 
must be read by a treaty interpreter in the light of contemporary con-
cerns of the community of nations about the protection and con-
                                                                                                                      
the power of speech and ways of talking in the context of labor disputes. See Stewart Clegg, 
Power, Rule and Domination: A Critical and Empirical Understanding of Power in 
Sociological Theory and Organizational Life 154 (1975). 
79 See White, supra note 68, at ix; N.E. Simmonds, The Changing Face of Private Law: Doc-
trinal Categories and the Regulatory State, 2 Legal Stud. 257, 257–58 (1982). 
80 See generally Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism (Ill. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Re-
search Paper Series, Paper No. 07-24, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1120244 
(discussing originalism in the context of the U.S. Constitution). 
81 See White, supra note 68, at xv. 
82 See U.S.—Shrimp Appellate Body Report, supra note 50, ¶ 114. 
83 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XX(g), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. Article XX of the GATT provides exceptions to the general 
“most-favored nation” rule of the GATT. Id. It provides, “nothing in this Agreement shall be 
construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures . . . 
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible resources if such measures are made effective 
in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption.” Id. 
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servation of the environment. While Article XX was not modi-
fied in the Uruguay Round, the preamble attached to the 
WTO Agreement shows that the signatories to that Agreement 
were, in 1994, fully aware of the importance and legitimacy of 
environmental protection as a goal of national and interna-
tional policy. . . . 
130. From the perspective embodied in the preamble of the 
WTO Agreement, we note that the generic term “natural re-
sources” in Article XX(g) is not “static” in its content or refer-
ence but is rather “by definition, evolutionary”. It is, there-
fore, pertinent to note that modern international conventions 
and declarations make frequent references to natural re-
sources as embracing both living and non-living resources.84 
Thus, because the WTO is a Member-driven treaty, interpreting the 
rules is, on this understanding of the language of the rules, as much a 
process of uncovering the thought processes and intentions of the 
Members as it is a process of imposing a meaning on the words them-
selves. Thus, the interpretation imposed on a rule must try to align with 
the original negotiating parties’ expectation of the degree to which the 
obligations in the WTO rules should evolve and change over time.85 
The success or failure of the panels’ and Appellate Body’s interpreta-
tion of those rules should, therefore, be assessed as successful depend-
ing solely on the degree to which they have accurately “unlocked” that 
intention. 
 Though important, this way of thinking about the language of the 
WTO rules as a vessel for the drafters’ intent suggests that the rules’ 
language is passive throughout the process of interpretation—that it 
neither has anything to add to the way rules control, or should control, 
Members’ behavior, nor plays any role in the way in which the panels 
and Appellate Body elucidate meaning from the text. There is also a 
sense, with this traditional view, that it would not matter whether we 
were discussing the rules’ scope in English, or the other official lan-
guages of the WTO, because however we understand them, the prob-
lems the rules are trying to address remain largely the same in any lan-
guage. Under this view, such linguistic difficulty only lies in the detail of 
                                                                                                                      
84 U.S.—Shrimp Appellate Body Report, supra note 50, ¶¶ 129–130 (emphasis added) 
(footnotes omitted). 
85 See U.S.—Reformulated Gasoline Appellate Body Report, supra note 48, at 18 (focus-
ing on the presumed intent of reasonable WTO members in interpreting Article XX of the 
GATT). 
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accurate translation from the language of negotiations to the language 
of the definitive texts. Once the true intentions of the trade negotiators 
have been extracted from the rules (for good or bad), the rules them-
selves, or more specifically the language of the rules, cease to be impor-
tant.86 
 In 1958 in Italian Discrimination Against Imported Agricultural Ma-
chinery, an early GATT panel hinted that this conventional view of the 
way meaning should be elicited from multiple translations of the lan-
guage in which the rules are expressed was too simplistic.87 The panel 
implied that imposing a single meaning on the language in which the 
rules were expressed was inevitably difficult because there were in fact 
three official languages (Spanish, English, and French), all of which 
were simultaneously equally authentic versions of the text.88 The panel 
acknowledged that Italy’s defense of a trade measure that offered pref-
erential credit facilities to some domestic farmers in violation of Article 
III of the GATT was based on an different and erroneous understand-
ing of the French translation of Article III:4 of the GATT.89 So even be-
fore the creation of the WTO dispute settlement system, it seems panel-
ists were aware that the act of interpretation was not as straightforward 
as merely trying to guess the Contracting Parties’ expectations of the 
precise time and extent that the meaning would evolve in each authen-
tic text.90 This realization opens the possibility that there may be an-
                                                                                                                      
 
86 See White, supra note 68, at x–xi. 
87 Report of the Panel, Italian Discrimination Against Imported Agricultural Machinery, 
¶¶ 11–16, L/833 ( July 15, 1958), GATT B.I.S.D. (7th Supp.) at 60, 63–65 (1959) [herein-
after Italian Agricultural Machinery]. 
88 See id. ¶ 11; see also Vienna Convention, supra note 48, art. 33.1 (“When a treaty has 
been authenticated in two or more languages, the text is equally authoritative in each lan-
guage, unless the treaty provides or the parties agree that, in case of divergence, a particu-
lar text shall prevail.”); art. 33.3 (“The terms of the treaty are presumed to have the same 
meaning in each authentic text.”). 
89 See Italian Agricultural Machinery, supra note 87, ¶¶ 11–12. The Panel reasoned: 
The French text which had been submitted to the Italian Parliament for ap-
proval provided that the imported products ne seront pas soumis à un traitement 
moins favorable whereas the English text read “the imported product shall be 
accorded treatment no less favourable.” It was clear from the English text that 
any favourable treatment granted to domestic products would have to be 
granted to like imported products and the fact that the particular law in ques-
tion did not specifically prescribe conditions of sale or purchase appeared ir-
relevant in the light of the English text. 
Id. ¶ 11. 
90 See id. ¶¶ 11–16. Note that at the time of the GATT, signatory states were referred to 
as “Contracting Parties” and not “Members” of the GATT. This changed following the crea-
tion of the WTO, when the WTO obtained legal personality. See Marrakesh Agreement, 
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other way to understand the interaction between the panel, the Appel-
late Body, and the language in which the rules are expressed when 
rules are interpreted in a dispute. 
 There are many ways to understand the nature of law and how law 
works. This Article does not attempt to engage with all these ways, as 
this would unnecessarily complicate the argument presented. What the 
discussion will now present is instead a first step to thinking more con-
ceptually about WTO law as a way to encourage others better versed in 
jurisprudence to reflect on these issues at a deeper level.91 
B. The WTO’s Unique Interpretive History 
 Interpreting the WTO’s rules is not simply a process of uncovering 
the hidden intentions of the Uruguay Round trade negotiators with a 
view to compelling WTO members to adhere to obligations they had 
agreed to (or acceded to). Instead, the process is much more complex. 
When the panels and Appellate Body interpret the WTO rules in a 
given dispute between members, they bring their knowledge and un-
derstanding of the way the WTO “works” to restrict Members’ power 
over the measures they use in their trade policies because the panelists 
and Appellate Body are experts in WTO law.92 The panels and Appel-
late Body then use that expertise to create an interface between their 
understanding of the rules and the arguments about the meaning of 
the text put forward by the various parties to the dispute as a method of 
                                                                                                                      
supra note 42, art. VIII. As each text is authentic, clearly each one should reflect the same 
intent as the other. Whether it is so easy to allow the meaning to evolve simultaneously in 
this way is a more complex question. See Karen McAuliffe, Precedent at the ECJ: The Linguistic 
Aspect, in 15 Law and Language: Current Legal Issues 483 (Michael Freeman & Fiona 
Smith eds., forthcoming 2013) (discussing the problems found in addressing this issue in 
the European Court of Justice). 
91 Other scholars offer a first move toward this in the context of public international 
law. See generally The Philosophy of International Law (Samantha Besson & John Ta-
sioulas eds., 2010) (collecting essays on a broad range of topics regarding the philosophy 
of international law). Donald Regan in particular theorizes WTO law by drawing on posi-
tivist conceptions of law. See generally Donald Regan, International Adjudication: A Response to 
Paulus—Courts, Custom, Treaties, Regimes and the WTO, in The Philosophy of Interna-
tional Law, supra, at 225 (discussing liberal, post-modern, and functionalist approaches 
to international law). 
92 See DSU, supra note 46, art. 17.3 (“The Appellate Body shall comprise persons of 
recognized authority, with demonstrated expertise in law, international trade and the sub-
ject matter of the covered agreements generally. . . . All persons serving on the Appellate 
Body . . . shall stay abreast of dispute settlement activities and other relevant activities of 
the WTO.”). 
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engaging with the various ways in which the text can be understood.93 
For example, in 2008 in United States—Final Anti-Dumping Measures on 
Stainless Steel from Mexico, the Appellate Body members used their un-
derstanding of the rules on anti-dumping contained in the WTO 
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the GATT as a way to 
understand the United States’ argument that its method of calculating 
the extent (or margin) of dumping of products into the U.S. domestic 
market was in fact correct.94 This process of understanding the United 
States’ arguments on the calculation of dumping might be described as 
one of translation, where the parties’ arguments are transformed out of 
their own interpretations of the text that largely support their own do-
mestic trade policies and into the formal structures of international 
trade law so that the meaning of the text in the dispute can be found by 
the panel and Appellate Body.95 
 To fully determine the meaning of the text and how it applies in a 
dispute, however, the panels and Appellate Body have to appreciate 
that the WTO rules were designed to be part of an inherited intellec-
tual tradition. This tradition contemplates that the way international 
trade should be regulated works in concert with the social context in 
which the rules operate.96 This specific conception of practical reason 
might be termed “the inherited interpretative culture of the rules.” 
 When the WTO rules were agreed upon by the Uruguay Round 
trade negotiators, the rules were designed to be understood by a par-
ticular group of people, namely, the trade negotiators themselves and 
also those government officials and lawyers who would be responsible 
for ensuring that states’ domestic trade policies conformed to the 
rules.97 The language used in the rules had to be the language of the 
trade law and policy audience to whom the trade rules would be ad-
dressed. This is an audience who understands that terms like “compara-
tive advantage” are synonymous with “giving all Members equality of 
                                                                                                                      
93 See Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes, World Trade Org., http://www.wto. 
org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2013). 
94 U.S.—Stainless Steel (Mexico) Appellate Body Report, supra note 44, ¶¶ 97–99. 
95 See White, supra note 68, at xvi. 
96 See Fiona Smith, Law, Language and International Trade Regulation in the WTO, in 63 
Current Legal Probs. 448, 456 (George Letsas & Colm O’Cinneide eds., 2010). See gen-
erally Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, at xxi–xxv ( Joel Weinsheimer & Don-
ald G. Marshall, trans., 2d ed. 2004) (arguing that social context informs the meaning of 
the language in a text); Chris Lawn, Wittgenstein and Gadamer: Towards a Post-
Analytic Philosophy of Language 1–40 (2004) (exploring an interesting distinction 
between semantics and hermeneutics). 
97 See Smith, supra note 96, at 457. 
2013] Boston College International & Comparative Law Review 1081 
opportunity in international trade”; that “protectionism” is a pejorative 
term identifying unacceptable trade measures used by Members to in-
sulate their domestic industries from cheap imports; and that “liberali-
zation” means a utopian vision where all resources are distributed 
equally between Members by the operation of a “free market” in goods 
and services and where economically powerful Members provide equal 
access to their domestic markets for weaker, less economically powerful 
Members.98 
 This language of trade lawyers, policymakers, and the existing 
rules in the GATT showed the Uruguay Round trade negotiators the 
way the WTO rules must be expressed. This language demonstrated 
what the rules could say and the way the rules should say it if they were 
to convince the trade negotiators, subsequent trade ministers, and all 
those subject to the rules, that the rules as drafted were a legitimate way 
of regulating international trade. The language of trade lawyers, poli-
cymakers, and the GATT dictated how the appropriate delimitation of 
the rules would be drawn and how the rules would establish guidelines 
as to when Members’ power to conduct domestic trade policies without 
regard to the impact on other Members would be restricted and when 
it would not. Finally, this language also demonstrated how to construct 
each rule within the required parameters so that it made sense to those 
who would be working with and subject to the rules.99 
 The Uruguay Round trade negotiators were able to include new 
words and phrases to more effectively control international trade than 
the GATT had.100 Although not from the language of the GATT, such 
phrases are legitimate linguistic means to control international trade 
because the way words are used, particularly how they take on meaning, 
how that meaning is fixed and then changed over time, is all estab-
lished by the inherited interpretative culture in which they exist. The 
trade negotiators responsible for agreeing to the WTO rules therefore 
could not simply create the rules out of nothing using any linguistic 
construction that they chose; they had to work within the parameters 
already set by the language in which they were operating. The language 
itself was channeling what could be said and what could not be said in 
the rules, and how it should be said. It dictated what new sense could 
be attributed to the particular terms in the rules, like whether there 
                                                                                                                      
98 See Michael Trebilcock et al., The Regulation of International Trade 1–20 
(4th ed. 2013) (providing a classic reiteration of the rationale for free trade liberalization). 
99 This Section draws inspiration from White, supra note 68, at xvi. 
100 See Smith, supra note 96, at 457 (describing such new words and phrases in the agri-
cultural context). 
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could be an evolutionary meaning to “exhaustible” in the text of “con-
servation of exhaustible natural resources,”101 or what domestic trade 
policies and state behavior in response to the rules would be regarded 
as legitimate or illegitimate, or in what ways the rules could be critically 
evaluated to make them “better” than the weaker provisions from the 
earlier GATT rules. 
 In other words, the WTO rules significantly modify and add to the 
obligations of the GATT, but they are built on the existing rules and the 
pro-trade liberalization interpretative tradition of the GATT.102 This 
interpretative tradition has its own language; way of speaking, express-
ing ideas, and defining problems and solutions; and way of embracing 
and excluding new ideas and meanings for the rules. Thus, WTO law 
has its own inherited interpretative culture—its own approach to rea-
soning with rules. This approach is created, delineated, and modified 
by language. The language of the WTO creates the inherited interpre-
tative culture in which it operates and controls what can be said and 
what cannot be said about it. It creates a “world of shared meanings.”103 
Thus, we should not be surprised in this “world” that ideas from outsid-
ers, like human rights and environmental scholars, about how WTO 
law should be regulated are often rejected as “wrong” or misguided by 
trade lawyers and policymakers. These ideas often place the individual 
at the heart of the analysis and address her diverse and complex needs 
in ways that simply do not translate readily into the language of com-
parative advantage and trade liberalization. We should not really be 
surprised therefore when trade experts dismiss them as wrong or mis-
guided, or when such ideas are castigated as “protectionist” —the most 
dismissive of trade lawyers’ insults.104 
                                                                                                                      
 
101 See U.S.—Shrimp Appellate Body Report, supra note 50, ¶¶ 113–114 (emphasis 
added); supra notes 82–85 and accompanying text (discussing the interpretation of GATT 
Article XX(g) in the U.S—Shrimp dispute). 
102 See generally Petros C. Mavroidis, The General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (2005) (describing the GATT’s core obligations and examining remaining GATT 
obligations in light of the advent of the WTO). 
103 See James Boyd White, When Words Lose Their Meanings: Constitutions and 
Reconstitutions of Language, Character, and Community 7 (1984). 
104 For example, protectionism was a theme in the famous Petersmann/Alston debate. 
Compare Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Time for a United Nations ‘Global Compact’ for Integrating 
Human Rights into the Law of Worldwide Organizations: Lessons from European Integration, 13 
Eur. J. Int’l L. 621, 624 (2002) (calling for organizations like the WTO to incorporate 
recognized human rights law into their law and practice), with Philip Alston, Resisting the 
Merger and Acquisition of Human Rights by Trade Law: A Reply to Petersmann, 13 Eur. J. Int’l 
L. 815, 816 (2002) (rejecting Petersmann’s proposal to enforce human rights through the 
WTO). See also Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Taking Human Dignity, Poverty and Empowerment of 
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C. The WTO’s Unique Interpretive Heritage as a Constraint on Interpretation 
 To find the meaning of the rules in any instance, the panel and 
Appellate Body members must situate their own interpretation of the 
text within a world of shared meanings. They must express their inter-
pretation in the same linguistic way the WTO Members’ expert legal 
representatives, policymakers, and academic commentators express 
their own ideas about the text and they must understand the language 
of the rules the way those legal advisers, policy officials, and academic 
commentators do. If the panels and Appellate Body do not talk about 
the rules as the other stakeholders do, understand the rules as they do, 
and phrase their interpretations of the meaning of WTO obligations as 
they do, the panels and Appellate Body lose the ability to talk about the 
rules: their words literally lose their meaning and have no sense in the 
culture of the WTO rules. In reality, this means their interpretation is 
declared wrong, misguided, or inappropriate, or they are thought to 
misunderstand the nature of the legal obligations or the task before 
them. For example, in 2008 in the United States—Final Anti-Dumping 
Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico dispute, the Appellate Body casti-
gated the lower panel for refusing to follow the Appellate Body’s previ-
ous rulings on the definition of “zeroing,” and thus not performing the 
panel’s legal obligations under the DSU.105 The decision highlights 
that deviation from the interpretive culture of the rules can be deemed 
a misapplication or violation of the rules themselves. 
 For the panel or Appellate Body’s interpretation of the rules in any 
instance to be regarded as legitimate, the panels and Appellate Body 
must fully embrace the inherited interpretative culture of the rules. 
They must express their interpretation of the rules’ meaning in line 
with the specific conception of practical reasoning under the WTO 
rules as a way of fully engaging with them. Understood in this way, in-
terpretation is a dynamic process: the panels and Appellate Body are 
always mediating between the contemporary practices of states and the 
inherited intellectual tradition of the text as they grapple to give effect 
to the rules in any given instance. This process of mediation is one cen-
tered around language (not political expediency) as the panels and 
Appellate Body, and the Members, must find some common way of un-
                                                                                                                      
Individuals More Seriously: Rejoinder to Alston, 13 Eur. J. Int’l L. 845, 845 (2002) (respond-
ing to Alston’s characterizations of Petersmann’s arguments). 
105 U.S.—Stainless Steel (Mexico) Appellate Body Report, supra note 44, ¶ 161–162 
(“We are deeply concerned about the Panel’s decision to depart from well-established 
Appellate Body jurisprudence clarifying the interpretation of the same legal issues.”). 
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derstanding one another.106 The result of this mediation is a new real-
ity. That is, there is a gradual and subtle enrichment of the inherited 
intellectual tradition of international trade law and, as a corollary, of 
the meaning which can be discerned in the rules. Hence, there is a 
growing and evolving linguistic space in the rules to accommodate 
Members’ contemporary domestic policies while maintaining the in-
herited intellectual culture of the WTO rules.107 
 Thus, interpretation of the language in which WTO rules are ex-
pressed is not simply a task of using the canons of construction of the 
Vienna Convention to find a meaning in the text and then fix an un-
derstanding of the WTO rules. Such an approach takes a view of the 
law as a formal structure with embedded meanings that can be readily 
extracted, thus aligning with the utopian view of the law that Kosken-
niemi describes.108 Likewise, interpretation of the language of the 
WTO rules is not a question of attuning the rules’ meaning into the 
needs of Members in their trade policies, as this would only give effect 
to the vested interests of its Members. Interpretation of WTO law in this 
case would be volatile and highly unstable, vacillating between which-
ever Member was the most economically powerful protagonist. Such a 
view would undermine the critical value of rules as an ameliorating in-
fluence on the exercise of illegitimate power in a world where Members 
possess different advantages and disadvantages in their international 
politics. In the current Doha Round of multilateral trade,109 developing 
countries’ needs in international trade are more important, so it is very 
clear that allowing the rules merely to reflect the needs of the eco-
nomically dominant Members is out of line with the current ambitions 
for international trade regulation.110 State behavior, especially abusive 
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behavior by economically powerful states, cannot (and should not) al-
ways determine the content of WTO law.111 Thus, interpretation of 
WTO law should not descend into an apology.112 
 For Koskenniemi, public international law is destined to slide be-
tween two opposing points: apology and utopia.113 WTO law has many 
roots in public international law and has certainly been enriched by 
much scholarship grounded in public international law. Therefore, on 
Koskenniemi’s theory, it would seem that WTO law, specifically the 
normative question of what should be the basis in which the language 
of the WTO rules should be interpreted, also would be prone to forever 
sliding between an apologetic notion of the WTO’s rules and a utopian 
vision. 
 Yet, WTO law appears to have an inherited intellectual culture—a 
way of reasoning with rules—that shapes and limits interpretation of 
the international trade rules by grounding meaning firmly in the rules’ 
language, rather than political expediency, as Koskenniemi claimed. 
This culture of the rules is like sticky toffee: although it allows for some 
pull between the apology and utopian visions of law Koskenniemi pow-
erfully charted, its stickiness prevents the permanent slide from one 
extreme to another. The language of the rules has its own character 
that shapes what can be said about the rules and the way it can be said. 
This language is not a means of communication over which the panels 
and Appellate Body retain full power. Instead, the language seems to 
possess its own dynamic existence that all the actors in international 
trade relations in the WTO—the panels, the Appellate Body, the poli-
cymakers, corporations, and nongovernmental organizations-—are all 
part of, and at the same time, contribute to. It does not appear possible 
to remain “outside” and unconnected from the language of the rules as 
though it were possible to reach for the toolbox of the rules of the Vi-
enna Convention’s canons of construction and then apply those tools 
to the interpretation of the language in the WTO rules in any way be-
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lieved to be appropriate. Thinking about how to apply rules or theoriz-
ing about them is always done in language. The rules’ language ap-
pears to create its own normative universe by driving what can be said 
and how it might be said. 
Conclusion 
 As a commentator on doctrinal WTO law, rather than a theorist, 
there is something elusive about the way law works that I observe when 
I analyze how the panels and Appellate Body interpret the rules and 
apply them to the measures at issue in various dispute settlement pro-
ceedings. In this Article, I have tried to give voice to that elusive quality 
of WTO law. The account here is inevitably limited and more work 
must be done on other theories on power to see whether they address 
the issue. Yet, even with this substantial caveat, several interesting ques-
tions already arise: if I am right and WTO law does have this distinct 
character, is its character relevant to any broader theory of power in the 
context of the WTO, or is it instead merely a phenomenon of the prac-
tice of law? Is it just a consequence of the coercive power of a vertically 
integrated network of states and therefore nothing more than what we 
should expect when thinking about international relations between 
states? Or is it a phenomenon of a state/dispute settlement dynamic 
and therefore of no relevance to other important actors in WTO law at 
all? But what if it is critical to a power analysis? What weight should we 
even attribute to it? Can it even be captured in a theory? Can we even 
answer these questions at all? 
 Despite these remaining questions, it is suggested that an accurate 
account of the nature of WTO law could help to further illuminate why 
the WTO so successfully curbs the abuse of power by economically 
dominant Members. And, more broadly, a full account of law seems to 
be particularly important for theories that rely on law to distinguish 
between the legitimate and illegitimate use of state power in interna-
tional relations. 
